

Executed	by
74-1733/1	

Production's
5 d. Perspectives

6 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

FROM: DDCI

SUBJECT: Comments on the "Perspectives for Intelligence -
1975-1980"

I think that these perspectives provide superb guidance at the executive level. I do have a few comments:

1. Covert action, political influence (abroad), and agents of influence (abroad) do not seem to have received the mention I feel they deserve.



3. More firm emphasis on Russian and Chinese language training than in 16.b.

4. Interrelation of procedures, improved communication and periodic evaluations are vitally necessary. I hope we can do this without homogenization.

Generally I feel that these perspectives provide, as I have said, superb guidance concerning the key targets in the coming years but I detect a tone of passiveness as to what can be done to avoid certain unfavorable events that seem to be flowing towards us.

V.S. Walter

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	S/MC				
4	DDS&T				
5	DDI				
6	DDM&S				
7	DDO				
8	D/DCI/IC	✓			
9	D/DCI/NIO				
10	OGC				
11	OLC				
12	IG				
13	Compt				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/S				
16	DTR				
17	Asst/DCI				
18	AO/DCI				
19					
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:

*For consolidation
w/other responses*

Executive Secretary

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

25X

7. The Third World will present a variety of problems. A number of local disputes will preoccupy not only the leaders of individual countries but the international community. Examples are relationships between India and Pakistan, black and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Arabia. Several existing disputes will continue to be a matter of concern to the international community and be the seeds of potential larger scale involvement (Arabs and Israel, North and South Vietnam, North and South Korea, Taiwan). A number of Third World countries will become increasingly antagonistic toward the great powers and their local presence in the economic, political and cultural spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America and South Asia. In this respect some identity of interest may grow between nations divided by the Cold War, developing into collaboration against both superpower complexes, e.g., Cuba and the Caribbean, the Arab nations, the rising Black nations of Africa, and the nations of the Malay Archipelago. Internally, many Third World nations will suffer serious damage from tribal and regional differences, economic extremism, and ideological zealots (India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, et al). Some of the Third World will find an outlet for its frustrations in self-defeating assaults on great power economic relationships

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

and in hamstringing the effectiveness of a variety of international forums.

8. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem from increased expectations and a perception of the growing economic gap between less developed countries (and classes within countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco, India, possibly the Malay Archipelago (including the Philippines) and the Caribbean. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by authoritarian governments, but they will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term and transferring power to successors. The resulting turbulence can present temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing differences or to great powers desirous of extending their influence. Such turbulence will also exist within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minorities turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent societies.

9. The acceleration of events will be a characteristic of the years ahead. This will come from improved communication and transporation, sharply reducing the time available to

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

~~SECRET~~

-10-

reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful negotiations. There will be a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans for individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception and management of a multiplicity of international relationships. Acceleration will also mark the process of change. To a major degree this will occur in the fields of science and technology, but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid or even immediate basis.

Part II - The Role of Intelligence

1. The primary charge on intelligence during the years ahead will be to provide accurate data and assessments with respect to the variety of complicated problems facing the United States. These must be in formats which will facilitate their communication to those responsible for decisions about U.S. policy. In particular, the need will be for early warning, because of the acceleration of events, to permit the resolution through negotiation of matters which might otherwise involve

~~SECRET~~

political, economic or military contest or unrest. The acceleration of events and the explosion of information will also require a major effort by intelligence to process raw information into manageable form and to devise adequate techniques for presentation to assist consumers in the identification of the essential elements of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments and the likely impact of alternative policy decisions. Intelligence will be increasingly expected to provide assessments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign powers, in addition to exact facts and the basic capabilities available to them.

2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major intelligence target. Its military power, its economic role in the world, its political policies will continue to pose major problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be expected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and economic activity. It will be expected also to supply reliable information on Soviet political dynamics and intentions. These must be supplemented by clear and accurate assessments of likely Soviet courses of action in the political, economic and military fields. While a small percentage of this material will become available through open exchange and access, vast fields of highly important information will be kept by the Soviets within a closed society, requiring extraordinary efforts

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

to obtain them. A particular requirement will be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitations agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military field special attention will be focused on Soviet research and development, in particular with respect to weapons systems which could substantially affect the balance of power (anti-submarine warfare, satellite systems, strategic deception, etc.). The readiness of Soviet forces will be a constant subject of attention. Intelligence will be required to maintain a base-line capability for tactical intelligence coverage, for rapid augmentation in case of local or general confrontation or conflict. Trends and factions in Soviet leadership and political doctrine will be a major subject of interest, to assist in negotiations and to warn of undesirable developments ahead. The Soviet role abroad, either directly through diplomatic means or indirectly through party or subversive means, will be a matter of particular attention with respect to the turbulence of the Third World. Soviet policy, power and determination will be of importance in Eastern Europe as well as in some of the areas of great power competition or exploitation of local power vacuums (Persian Gulf, India, etc.). 25

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

SECRET

-14-

25X

6. Intelligence will increasingly be looked to to warn of and explain baffling new situations, posing problems to American interests. An example will be to identify the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in Third World countries, so the component elements of these problems can be isolated, negotiated about or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require intelligence to develop new categorizations of behavior and motivation to reflect the differences between societies, cultures and national personalities.

SECRET

SECRET

-15-

7. A few of the major problems which will be either the subject of dispute or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be priority intelligence requirements, can be listed:

(a) Economic interrelationships in monetary, trade, and resource control, especially with respect to long-term inflation, energy demand and supply, and population growth. Patterns of commercial and business activity (the multinational corporations, foreign investment, etc.). The division of return between raw material, processing and finishing operations, and environment control.

(b) Communications and transportation, including movement of goods, information and persons.

(c) Arms limitations, nuclear proliferation and crisis avoidance.

(d) Jurisdiction, exploitation, and relationships in the oceans and on sea beds.

(e) Space exploitation and the use of space with respect to national territories.

Part III - Implications for Intelligence Planning

A. Collection vs. Exploitation

1. Over the past decade, management focus and the allocation of resources have been directed especially to the application of advanced technology to the collection and, to a

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

lesser degree, the processing of intelligence data. This has been highly successful, resulting in major substantive advances in our knowledge, particularly with regard to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. This investment has made a major contribution to the negotiations required for detente.

2. This forward technological progress will soon reach a plateau with new capabilities in the photo and SIGINT fields. This plateau will present large problems of success.

3. Within the time frame of this document, an important and pervasive problem facing the Intelligence Community will be to ensure efficient exploitation of the enormous amounts of data it will be collecting. Exploitation means not only sifting, selecting and processing the most relevant data, but also the application of advanced techniques of transfer of data to the point of ultimate use, to analysis and production and to the presentation of the end products to the ultimate users of intelligence.

25

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

and reducing manpower and investment on lower priority material.

(b) Development of improved methods of analysis and production.

(c) Development of improved methods of presentation.

B. Demands vs. Resources

5. Another problem of great magnitude facing the Community over the next five to ten years will be the changing (and in all probability increasing) demands for intelligence while available resources for intelligence decrease in real terms.

6. In the past, the major portion of our intelligence effort has necessarily been deployed against the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and our other adversaries, actual and potential. Even assuming a period of genuine detente, much of this military focus must be maintained because of the importance of this subject to national security and the need for information on the quality of enemy weapons systems. It must not only serve to keep us alert militarily, but also support negotiations and verify arms limitations agreements. At the same time, the demands for other types of intelligence are growing. The result is a probable net increase in demand with a new proportionate mix among political, economic, military and technical target objectives.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

SECRET

-18-

7. This simultaneous shift and increase in requirements is occurring in a period of serious resource constraint and continuing inflation. Until very recently we have had the freedom to invest resources in a number of functional areas simultaneously without undue difficulty. This is no longer true. We will have to accomplish our objectives without the benefit of significantly greater resources. We must find trade-offs in the systems we use, the areas we cover, and the depth of the data we seek.

8. One area which holds promise for greater efficiency is the national/tactical interface. Current studies seek to identify ways by which national programs can more directly support tactical requirements, and vice versa. As more capable and flexible systems come into the national inventory, they must be made to serve the needs of operational forces as well as national-level consumers. Modernized systems and procedures which, by their design, permit greater mutuality of effort between national and force support activities should enable trade-offs achieving net resource savings.

25

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110017-8

Routing Slip

DDCI
74-1733

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC	✓	
2	DDCI	✓		12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt	✓	
4	DDS&T	✓		14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI	✓		15	AO/DCI		
6	DDM&S	✓		16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO	✓		17			
8	D/DCI/IC	✓		18			
9	D/DCI/NIO	✓		19			
10	GC	✓		20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Comments pls, before
I circulate it to
USIB/IRAC

Suspense 11 June 1974

6/4/74